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Developments in open-economy modeling, and the accumulation of experience with the 
monetary policy regimes prevailing in the United Kingdom and the euro area, have 
increased our ability to evaluate the effects that joining monetary union would have on 
the U.K. economy.  This paper considers the debate on the United Kingdom’s monetary 
policy options using a structural open-economy model.  We use the Erceg, Gust, and 
López-Salido (EGL) (2007) model to explore both the existing U.K. regime (CPI 
inflation targeting combined with a floating exchange rate), and adoption of the euro, as 
monetary policy options for the United Kingdom.  Experiments with a baseline estimated 
version of the model suggest that there is improved stability for the U.K. economy with 
monetary union.  Once large differences in the degree of nominal rigidity across 
economies are considered, the balance tilts toward the existing U.K. monetary policy 
regime.  The improvement in U.K. economic stability under monetary union also 
diminishes if imports from the euro area are modeled as primarily intermediates instead 
of finished goods; or if we assume that the pressures reflected in foreign exchange market 
shocks, instead of vanishing with monetary union, are now manifested as an additional 
source of disturbances to domestic aggregate spending. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In June 1999, a poll taken of London-based economists indicated that 65% believed that 
the United Kingdom would join the euro area by 2005.
1 A decade later, not only has U.K. 
participation in monetary union not taken place, but such a development no longer seems 
to be the question of “when, not if” that it once appeared.  While euro entry has faded as 
a likely prospect for the United Kingdom, the decade of coexisting European Central 
Bank and Bank of England monetary regimes has provided a firmer picture of the 
differences between the two regimes and of the likely effect that monetary union would 
have on U.K. economic performance.  The analysis that follows uses a structural open-
economy model to evaluate the effect that becoming a euro area member would have on 
the U.K. economy. 
 
Our discussion in Section 2 provides a background to the debate on European monetary 
union in the United Kingdom.  Section 3 discusses some of the economic arguments that 
have been raised on both sides of the euro-adoption debate.  Section 4 describes the main 
properties of the model, which is given in detail in an appendix.  Section 5 provides 
simulation results for alternative policies.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The United Kingdom and European economic and monetary union 
 
The issue of economic and monetary union has been a longstanding—though until the 
late 1980s only a sporadic—part of the debate about the implications of the United 
Kingdom’s integration into the European Union.  The successful negotiations for U.K. 
entry into the European Economic Community (EEC, now the European Union) during 
1970−72 coincided with the EEC’s consideration of the Werner Report
2 proposals for 
economic and monetary union.  In fact, the first instance of the term “euro” being used to 
describe the putative union currency appears to have been in a discussion in the U.K. 
press during that period.
3 The United Kingdom seemingly affirmed its commitment to 
economic and monetary union in joint statements with EEC members in 1972, 1974, 
1985, and 1989.  But since 1974, U.K. policymakers have expressed reservations about 
——————————————————————————————————— 
1 See MacRae (1999). 
2 Commission of the European Communities (1970). 
3 The Oxford English Dictionary online (www.oed.com) gives a 1971 U.K. press discussion as the first use 
of the term “Euro.”  But we have been unable to verify this, as the citation details given in the OED appear 
to be faulty.   2
economic and monetary union, which were finally made official with the securing of an 
“opt-out” clause in 1991 that was executed in 1997. 
 
The United Kingdom did not join the European Communities until January 1, 1973.  At a 
Paris summit in 1972, however, Prime Minister Edward Heath had endorsed the concept 
of economic and monetary union, with a 1980 deadline.  In October 1972, Alec Douglas-
Home, the Foreign Secretary in the Heath Government, listed European monetary union 
as a priority in the U.K. government’s agenda for the EEC (Associated Press, 1972).  But 
after a change of government and a further Paris summit in 1974, the official position on 
monetary union changed.  Prime Minister Harold Wilson said he “did not find anyone in 
Paris… who believed there was the remotest possibility of economic and monetary union 
by 1980,” adding that there was “not a hope in hell… of EMU taking place in the near 
future.”
4 Elsewhere in his statement, Wilson appeared to suggest that EMU was 
undesirable in principle even without the 1980 timetable, but he acknowledged that the 
1974 summit communiqué had “made EMU a long-term objective.”  The wording of the 
communiqué specifically referred to EMU as an “ultimate goal,” though Wilson 
explained to his Cabinet colleagues that, despite signing the communiqué, “I made it 
clear it was a goal we do not share.”
5 This discrepancy foreshadowed the pattern in the 
1980s, where the United Kingdom would co-sign affirmations of the EMU goal, only to 
express qualifications in an unwritten or unofficial form. 
 
For the rest of the 1970s, EMU receded as an issue.  The EEC’s Study Group on the Role 
of Public Finance (1977, p. 11) noted, “Monetary union, on which much has been 
written, is... a long way off and will probably have to await major developments in the 
political, monetary, and fiscal fields.”  A step in this direction was the European 
Monetary System (EMS), in particular its exchange rate mechanism (ERM),
6 which the 
United Kingdom contemplated joining as a founding member in 1978−79.  At the time, 
however, the exchange rate mechanism was not perceived as part of a formal plan for 
monetary union.  For example, a 1978 U.K. parliamentary committee noted that the EMS 
proposal was “far from being a major step on the way to European Economic and 
Monetary Union,” and that the Werner proposals for monetary union had been “agreed… 
but subsequently abandoned.” (Expenditure Committee, 1978, p. X.) 
——————————————————————————————————— 
4 Wilson, in House of Commons Debates, December 16, 1974, pages 1127 and 1139. 
5 Wilson speaking on December 12, 1974, quoted in Castle (1980, p. 249). 
6 The “ERM” terminology only became prevalent in U.K. policy debates starting in mid-1989; in most of 
the pre-1989 discussions within the United Kingdom, the term EMS was used to refer to the exchange rate 
mechanism.   3
The lull in progress toward European economic and monetary union was broken in 1985 
with agreement on a single market.  This involved the United Kingdom and other EEC 
members signing a treaty amendment referring to economic and monetary union as a 
goal.  The United Kingdom under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher further joined in 
Madrid (1989) and Dublin (1990) summit declarations endorsing a process that would 
culminate in economic and monetary union.  In explaining her apparent endorsement of 
EMU on occasions like these, Thatcher said in 1990 that her definition of EMU was 
“economic and monetary cooperation.”
7 
 
In 1990 Thatcher came out unambiguously against monetary union, declaring the United 
Kingdom’s own currency (the pound sterling) its “greatest expression of sovereignty.”
8 
Disagreement over EMU played a key role in her forced resignation.  Thatcher’s 
successor, John Major, was not opposed unconditionally to EMU but took the key step of 
securing for the United Kingdom the option not to participate in monetary union.  At the 
Maastricht summit in December 1991, Major obtained an opt-out provision as a condition 
of U.K. participation in the Maastricht Treaty. The opt-out pertained to “Stage 3” of 
economic and monetary union, i.e., the stage at which the union amounted to a single 
currency. 
 
The likelihood of the United Kingdom joining in monetary union receded further with the 
collapse of its membership of the exchange rate mechanism in 1992 and the perceived 
success of domestic monetary policy in the early years of inflation targeting (1992−97).  
For the 1997 general election, both major political parties were committed to a policy of 
seeking referendum approval before any final decision to enter monetary union could be 
formalized.  Shortly after its election in 1997, the Blair Government “committed the U.K. 
to the principle of joining the single currency” (HM Treasury, 2003a, p. 1), but made any 
recommendation of actual entry (and hence a referendum) conditional on the five 




  [1] Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others 
could live with euro interest rates on a permanent basis?  
——————————————————————————————————— 
7 Thatcher, interview with Sunday Times, October 15, 1990, stored at www.margaretthatcher.org. 
8 Thatcher, in House of Commons Debates, October 30, 1990, page 874. 
9 Given in HM Treasury (2003a, p. I), but originally stated (with some variation in wording) by the 
Government in 1997.   4
[2] If problems emerge[,] is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?  
[3] Would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making long-term decisions 
to invest in Britain?  
[4]What impact would entry into EMU have on the financial services industry?  
[5] In summary, will joining EMU promote higher growth, stability and a lasting 
increase in jobs? 
 
The U.K. Government determined in 1997 and 2003 that these tests had not been 
satisfied, and so did not proceed to a referendum on U.K. membership of the euro area.  
(See especially HM Treasury, 2003b.) 
 
The prospect of the United Kingdom becoming a member of the euro area now seems 
remote.  Good macroeconomic performance from 1997 to 2007, the related consolidation 
of the inflation targeting regime, and the move to even greater seniority within the U.K. 
government of critics of membership (most notably Gordon Brown’s move from 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to Prime Minister) have all been factors reducing the 
likelihood of euro adoption. 
 
Let us consider, however, the five economic tests and the extent to which our analysis 
below can bear on them.  Question [4] is an industry-level question not easy to answer 
with a macroeconomic model, while [3] and aspects of [5] cover questions more suitably 
answered with a model that accounts for changes in long-term economic growth.  We 
therefore consider those questions most suited to a macroeconomic analysis: the 
interrelated questions [1] and [2] as well as the “stability” aspect of test [5].  These were 
also the aspects of the five economic tests which the U.K. authorities (in HM Treasury, 
2003a) stressed that the United Kingdom had not met.  We interpret these tests as jointly 
amounting to a test of whether monetary union improves upon or is at least competitive 
with the existing U.K. monetary policy regime (inflation targeting) in contributing to 
macroeconomic stabilization. 
 
Before outlining our modeling strategy for investigating this question, we consider some 
key aspects of the economic debate on the United Kingdom’s place in European 
monetary union. 
 
   5
3.  The economic debate over the merits of monetary union 
 
Some early discussions of the United Kingdom’s position in the European Union took 
monetary union as an eventual implication of movement to a single trading market.  For 
example, Lionel Robbins stated in 1971, “I do not think that in the end a common market, 
just like that, can function well if there is not something like a common money.”
10 In 
1991, former Prime Minister Edward Heath said that “any economist” would say that that 
once the European Union became a single market (in 1992), “there was no alternative to a 
single currency.”
11 These positions, have, however, not had an enduring influence, and 
the merits of monetary union for the United Kingdom are now seen as an issue separable 
from the merits of membership in the European Union. 
 
As noted above, a major element of the opposition to European monetary union has taken 
the form of opposition to the perceived loss of political sovereignty, and some adherents 
to that political argument regard it as a sufficient condition for rejecting monetary union 
even if euro membership could be shown to be desirable on economic grounds.  This 
seemed to be the stand taken by several members of the Conservative governments over 
the 1990s—see Stephens (1997, pp. 309−315)—but that position was decisively 
renounced as government policy when in 1997 the Blair Government appealed 
exclusively to economic merits as the criteria for entry. 
 
The most important implication of monetary union for economic management was 
identified by Prime Minister Wilson’s observation in 1974 that union “would mean one 
central bank, one central currency… [E]very country would have to pursue exactly the 
same policy with that single currency…”  Wilson argued that therefore it was an 
“illusion” to believe that monetary union would occur.
12 While Wilson’s conclusion 
proved to be a flawed prediction for much of the European Union, his discussion of the 
main economic implications of monetary union did anticipate much of the subsequent 
debate.  This debate takes as a starting point the acceptance that a single macroeconomic 
or demand management (specifically, monetary) policy is implied by union, and aims to 
establish whether the associated loss of flexibility for the U.K. economy is outweighed by 
economic benefits of membership.  The debate on euro membership therefore combines 
two long-lasting themes in U.K. policy debates: the desirable degree of economic 
——————————————————————————————————— 
10 Robbins, in House of Lords Debates, July 28, 1971, page 450. 
11 Heath, in House of Commons Debates, November 21, 1991, page 459. 
12 Wilson, in House of Commons Debates, December 16, 1974, pages 1127−1128.   6
integration with “Europe”; and whether the United Kingdom should give up its freedom 
to have its own monetary policy.
13 
 
Many of the details of the economic debate on U.K. membership have been concerned 
with exchange rate behavior.  Euro adoption would mean the end of a regime in which 
the U.K. pound sterling floats against the euro.  Much of the discussion of Buiter (1999), 
Minford (2002), and Artis and Ehrmann (2006) centers on the issue of whether the 
exchange rate, when allowed to float, adapts efficiently to shocks; or if it instead fails to 
respond to fundamentals in a stabilizing manner, and so (ceteris paribus) magnifies 
macroeconomic variability.  Such a way of framing the issue happens to understate the 
benefits for a country of monetary policy autonomy.  For it is certainly not the case that 
the benefits of monetary autonomy are absent if the exchange rate is driven by 
nonfundamental factors.  Irrespective of what factors drive the exchange rate, a floating 
rate confers on the central bank autonomy in determination of the amount of base money 
in existence and so the ability to use domestic short-term interest rates as a policy 
instrument.  This benefit does not depend on a well-behaved exchange rate—it is 
completely ensured by Phillips and IS curves that have standard properties (i.e., with 
aggregate demand sensitive to real short-term interest rates—possibly indirectly via a 
term-structure connection to long rates; and with prices adjusting gradually to aggregate 
demand, so that a Phillips curve that becomes vertical in the long run describes inflation 
dynamics).  So for the exchange rate to respond to “fundamentals” is not a necessary 
condition for a floating exchange rate to be desirable.  In relation to this point, Corsetti, 
Dedola, and Leduc (2007) present a model where the exchange rate fails completely to 
adhere to fundamentals, yet the monetary policy strategy followed by the U.K. authorities 
in preference to monetary union—i.e., focusing on a CPI inflation target alongside a 
floating exchange rate—is optimal. 
 
Nevertheless, it is true that one possible benefit of a floating rate is its potential ability to 
contribute to stabilization.  The debate on whether the exchange rate provides this 
stabilizing role in practice can be represented by reference to a standard uncovered 
interest parity condition (see e.g., Woodford, 2001, p. 308): 
 
——————————————————————————————————— 
13 Debates on the second issue predate the creation of any version of the European Union.  Indeed, one of 
the pioneer Keynesians, Richard Kahn, argued, “If Keynes can be said to have devoted his life to anything, 
it is to liberating internal policy from the domination of external factors.” (Kahn, 1956, p. 113.)  Milton 
Friedman made a similar assessment of Keynes’ contribution (Friedman, 1983).    7
qt = Etqt+1 –[(Rt – Etπt+1) − (Rt* – Etπt+1*)] + ψt      ( 1 )  
 
where asterisks denote other-economy values, qt is the log real exchange rate, Rt is the 
domestic short-term nominal interest rate in quarterly units, πt is quarterly inflation, and 
ψt is an exogenous time-varying risk-premium (i.e., a shock to the UIP condition).  There 
is wide agreement that, in practice, the real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate 
move in the same direction in the short run under floating exchange rate regimes.  
Therefore, claims about whether the nominal exchange rate performs a stabilizing 
function can be mapped into similar claims about the short-run behavior of qt.  
 
The view that a floating exchange rate helps macroeconomic stabilization can be broken 
into two elements: (i) Different shock patterns or different structure in the home 
economy, relative to the other economy, might lead to the “natural interest rate” differing 
across economies.  To the extent that stabilization of the home economy’s output gap and 
its aggregate inflation rate require adjustment of nominal interest rates to levels different 
from those prevailing in the other economy, this adjustment can be accomplished because 
exchange rate flexibility allows interest rates to differ across economies—i.e., qt and 
Etqt+1 are free to move to satisfy the UIP condition if monetary policy moves domestic 
real and nominal interest rates away from the corresponding other-economy values.  (ii) 
Fluctuations in the risk premium ψt may occur for reasons of economic fundamentals, 
and the efficient response might be a nominal exchange rate reaction rather than a 
reaction of domestic interest rates.  With a floating nominal exchange rate, this can occur, 
and this kind of adjustment has, for example, often been argued to describe the Australian 
dollar’s reaction to the 1990s Asian market crises.  Monetary union, however, precludes 
an adjustment along these lines of the domestic economy and of the nominal exchange 
rate. 
 
The advocacy of euro membership for the United Kingdom in Buiter (1999) does not use 
an explicit model, but Buiter’s analysis implicitly assumes away the model elements that 
deliver the scenarios described in (i) and (ii) above.  Buiter (1999, p. 30) essentially rules 
out case (i) in his statement that “in a rather small and open economy like the U.K., 
monetary policy works primarily (even if not reliably) through the exchange rate.”  The 
position that the exchange-rate channel is the main channel through which monetary 
policy operates in an open economy is very restrictive.  It is true that the Mundell-
Fleming model and some modern optimization-based models remove the real interest rate   8
from the list of variables that the home-country central bank can influence in the short 
run.
14 But this result does not hold in models in which the aggregate consumer price 
index is sticky (e.g., models where imports are intermediates alone and final goods prices 
are sticky, as in McCallum and Nelson, 1999; or models where imports are final goods 
but are priced sluggishly, as in Monacelli, 2005).  And it is not obvious that the domestic 
channel of monetary policy is negligible in open economy models in general.  In other 
words, a portion of aggregate real spending may be sensitive to the real interest rate 
rather than just the real exchange rate, so this component of aggregate demand can be 
affected by any monetary policy that can influence real interest rates even if monetary 
policy’s impact on the exchange rate is unreliable.  Work done with explicitly 
optimization-based open-economy models with nominal rigidities does not in general 
support the notion that, in an open economy, monetary policy ceases to work through any 
channel other than the exchange rate.  Thus Faia and Monacelli (2008, p. 745), while 
concluding that “the nature of optimal monetary policy in an open economy emerges as 
fundamentally different from the one of a closed economy,” do not deny a domestic 
monetary policy channel; domestic real short-term interest rates appear in their 
consumption Euler equation in the usual manner, so monetary policy can influence 
aggregate demand via this “domestic” channel if it is able to affect domestic short-term 
real interest rates in the short run.  
 
The existence of a substantial domestic-spending channel of monetary policy seems to be 
widely accepted for the analysis of the United Kingdom, and the Bank of England’s 
official descriptions of its view of monetary policy transmission include a prominent 
domestic channel (see, for example, Bank of England, 1999).  Moreover, the U.K. 
Treasury’s assessment of the costs and benefits of euro adoption emphasized the different 
arrangements for mortgage lending across the United Kingdom and euro area, a 
comparison that would be irrelevant if no domestic channel of monetary policy existed.
15 
The record of U.K. monetary policy episodes also suggests that aggregate demand and 
inflation do respond to monetary policy actions even when the behavior of the exchange 
rate does not appear to be in keeping with the direction expected from a monetary policy 
change: for example, tightenings in 1976 and 1989 were followed by contractions in 
aggregate demand, even though the sterling exchange rate depreciated for protracted 
——————————————————————————————————— 
14 See Woodford (2007) for a discussion of the capacity of the central bank to influence real rates in 
optimizing open-economy models. 
15 See H.M. Treasury (2003b).  The Treasury emphasized the fact that in the U.K. mortgage interest rates 
are predominantly adjustable, while in the euro area they are often fixed.  See Rubio (2008) for an 
investigation of this distinction in a general equilibrium model.   9
periods.  The predominant conclusion from theory and evidence is that domestic channels 
of monetary policy are present and substantial, so, as suggested above, floating exchange 
rates confer on the central bank the ability to determine nominal aggregate demand and 
the inflation rate, even if the exchange rate channel cannot be relied upon. 
 
In opposition to position (ii), the euro entry advocates have argue that the UIP shock ψt  is 
not a fundamental shock; rather, it reflects an inefficiency or “noise” created by the 
foreign exchange market, and so any movement it tends to induce in qt is undesirable.  By 
analogy with the cost-push shock in large DSGE models (see especially Smets and 
Wouters, 2005, p. 163), the UIP shock is, according to this argument, a friction that 
distorts prices and moves the economy further away from its efficient allocation, and is 
not a shock to which real variables would respond in an efficient flexible-price 
equilibrium.  This argument leads to Buiter’s (1999) position that it is desirable to abolish 
the sterling/euro foreign exchange market by imposing monetary union.  Then the 
condition Rt = Rt* is an identifying feature of a monetary union.  The nominal exchange 
rate is removed from the system as a variable.  To the extent that UIP shocks owe their 
existence to the market for nominal foreign exchange, the elimination of that market 
removes UIP shocks from the model.  Monetary union is, in that case, materially different 
from both floating-exchange-rate and fixed-exchange-rate environments. 
 
The view of critics of monetary union is that union does not remove UIP shocks; instead, 
it changes the way that they create pressures.  Blanchard (1997, p. 288), for example, 
argues that “while a common currency will indeed eliminate exchange rate crises, it will 
not eliminate the underlying reason for such crises—namely, the fact that different 
interest rates, as well as adjustments in exchange rates, are needed…”  Elimination of a 
floating nominal exchange rate, according to this view, removes a convenient means with 
which to adapt to the pressure of UIP shocks.  Absent floating exchange rates, the 
pressure of such shocks might be felt in other economic relationships.  For example, the 
pressure formerly felt as UIP shocks might now manifest itself as an increase in the 
variance of shocks to the IS equation. 
 
All in all, the a priori arguments that led to Buiter’s (1999) conclusion that the case for 
euro adoption by the United Kingdom was “overwhelming” do not seem compelling, as 
modern open-economy models produce many counterexamples.  It is desirable instead to 
consider an explicit structural model that embeds and quantifies many of the model 
elements underlying the debate on monetary union.  We do this in Section 4.   10
3.1 The sterling appreciation 
 
The United Kingdom experienced a “strong pound” period starting in 1996 and 
continuing during nearly a decade of the euro’s existence (see Figure 1).  This period has 
been said to demonstrate the defects of floating exchange rates as an arrangement for the 
United Kingdom.  It has been emphasized by critics of floating that the sterling 
appreciation is difficult to trace to economic fundamentals (see e.g., Cobham, 2006).  The 
recent sudden reversal of the pound appreciation, at a time of worldwide contraction in 
the financial services business, is said by euro-membership advocates to demonstrate 
further the disadvantage of the United Kingdom’s exercise of its opt-out from euro 
participation.  Proponents of U.K. participation contend that the strong pound shifted 
U.K. employment from the exchange-rate-sensitive manufacturing sector to the financial 
services sector, and that the latter increase in employment has proved to be ephemeral. 
 
In our view, however, this episode does not provide unambiguous evidence against the 
advantages claimed for floating exchange rates.  In particular, the case made by 
membership proponents neglects the major contribution to macroeconomic stabilization 
that U.K. monetary policy made during the strong-pound period of 1996−2007.  
Monetary Policy Committee decisions had a favorable effect during the period of 
stagnant or falling manufacturing output and industrial production indices from 1997 to 
2007.  In 1990−92, the United Kingdom had a fixed exchange rate and no monetary 
policy autonomy; during this earlier episode of an overvalued pound, contraction 
proceeded in both the manufacturing sector and aggregate economic activity.  In 
1997−2007, by contrast, the strong pound was associated with stagnant or declining 
indices of industrial and manufacturing production, but also with continuous and 
respectable growth in real GDP.  This is brought out in Figure 2, which plots annual-
average data (from IFS) of U.K. industrial production and U.K. real GDP for 1990−2007.  
We would argue that, by concentrating on the stabilization of macroeconomic aggregates, 
the Monetary Policy Committee over this period managed to stop the manufacturing 
contraction from being associated with aggregate economic contraction.  The reason it 
was able to do this was the United Kingdom’s monetary policy autonomy, which neither 
a monetary union nor fixed exchange rate would have permitted.  
 
As for the rapid end of the strong-pound era in 2008, this can be seen as a stabilizing 
development.   By stimulating net exports, the turnabout in sterling behavior lessened the 
implications for U.K. aggregate output and employment of the downturn in the U.K.   11









1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: Haver/OECD 
 
Figure 2. Indexes of Industrial Production and Real GDP, 
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financial services business.  The floating pound has also allowed the MPC to ease  
monetary policy vigorously relative to euro area policy—a room to move dramatically 
exemplified by the MPC’s 150-basis point cut in the U.K. Bank Rate in November 2008, 
and by its adoption of quantitative easing in 2009. 
 
4.  A structural model for considering monetary union questions 
 
The model we use is the two-country open-economy system of Erceg, Gust, and López-
Salido (EGL) (2007).  This model has several major attractions for the study of the 
United Kingdom’s monetary policy options.  First, the model is based on optimizing 
behavior, so consideration of alternative monetary regimes (in either the U.K. economy 
or the euro area) is a natural and legitimate experiment.  In particular, we can explore CPI 
inflation targeting and monetary union as U.K. monetary policy options.  Second, the 
model is flexible enough to allow the two economies to be asymmetric on several 
important dimensions: e.g., relative size, technology, shock specification and degree of 
nominal rigidity (for both prices and wages).  This flexibility allows us to determine the 
impact of monetary union in the presence of different economic structures (and different 
shock processes) in the United Kingdom and the euro area.  Third, Erceg, Gust, and 
López-Salido (2007) show that the model allows the domestic real interest rate and 
output gap to be affected substantially by domestic shocks, so there is a nontrivial 
“domestic” channel despite the presence of openness.  This means that our results do not 
depend on the caricature that U.K. monetary policy effectiveness relies on an exchange 
rate channel.  Fourth, the model can be adjusted to allow for a portion of the volume of 
imports to be intermediate goods.  We can therefore use a feature that was advocated for 
optimizing open-economy models by McCallum and Nelson (1999), and found 
convenient for the analysis of monetary policy in open economies by Erceg (2002) and 
Smets and Wouters (2002). 
 
As the model has been laid out in detail in Erceg, Gust, and López-Salido (2007), we 
simply summarize its main elements here, presenting the basic equations in an appendix. 
Households’ consumption choice is represented by a standard Euler equation.  
Government spending in each country is exogenous and is the source of an “IS” shock.  
The production function features labor input, an exogenous technology shock specific to 
each economy, and a fixed capital stock.  Labor is immobile across countries.  Firms and 
workers enter the goods and labor markets respectively with a degree of monopoly power 
and with Calvo-style obstacles to adjustment of the offered prices for their goods and   13
labor services.  These contracts are augmented by dynamic indexation: all wage contracts 
are scaled up by the prior period’s wage inflation rate; all price contracts, by prior price 
inflation.  In our estimated version of the model, imports are final consumer goods.  The 
prices of imports are flexible. 
 
4.1 Specification and estimation 
 
We assume that the home economy’s size is 20% that of the other economy, in order to 
give the model a “United Kingdom = home economy; euro area = other economy” 
interpretation.  We set the steady-state share of government spending in GDP to 0.33 in 
the United Kingdom, 0.338 in the euro area.  The import share of GDP for each economy 
is intended to capture the degree of each economy’s trade with one another.  We make 
the share 13.5% for the United Kingdom; together with the relative sizes of the economy, 
this implies a 2.7% import share for the euro area.  The latter takes such a low value 
because we are neglecting non-U.K. imports into the euro area, given the model’s two-
economy structure.  We fix the exchange rate elasticity of traded goods at EGL’s baseline 
value of 1.5 and the steady-state wage markup in both economies at 50%.  The discount 
rate (β) is set at 0.9925, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set at 1/σ = 1/2, and 
the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply assumed to be χ = 5. 
 
While we estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption and the 
labor supply elasticity of households using U.K. and euro area data, we constrain the 
estimate of each parameter to be the same across the two economies. 
 
The monetary policy rule specification is similar but not identical across economies.  For 
the United Kingdom, the monetary policy rule has the short-term nominal interest rate 
respond in a smoothed manner to the lagged four-quarter retail price inflation rate (which 
we use as the empirical measure for the United Kingdom of consumer price inflation, πC) 




U.K.  + (1−ρR) γπ(0.25*(πC,t−1
U.K.  + πC,t−2
U.K.  + πC,t−3
U.K.  + πC,t−4
U.K.))  
         + (1−ρR) γyyt−1
U.K.  + eRt
 U.K.        ( 2 )  
 
Here constants are suppressed, and the monetary policy shock eRt is assumed to be an 
AR(1) process.  Other than lagging the variables one more period, this specification is a 
restricted version of the policy rule estimated for the United States by Rotemberg and   14
Woodford (1997), and also follows their use of loglinearly detrended real GDP as the 
variable to which the authorities respond.  Again paralleling Rotemberg and Woodford’s 
specification, the above reaction function above delivers a “long-run” rule of the Taylor 
form.  Our modeling of policymaker behavior using this simple three-parameter rule 
requires justification in light of Favero’s (2000, p. 237) position that “a strategy closer to 
the spirit of intertemporal optimization seems more appropriate” in the estimation of 
policy rules.  The use of a simple rule can be defended both on practical grounds—the 
EGL model is too large for the implied optimal-policy conditions to deliver rules 
tractable enough for econometric estimation—and for reasons of realism—the inflation 
variable that U.K. policymakers over our sample concerned themselves with was a CPI-
like concept, not the combination of wage inflation and domestic-goods price inflation 
that the EGL model would tend to suggest should be targeted. 
 
For the euro area, a similar policy rule specification is estimated, though with no 
constraint that the estimated responses, or the AR(1) parameter and innovation variance 
for the shock, be the same as in the United Kingdom.  An important qualification is that 
for the euro area we assume that the inflation variable that enters the rule is the 
(annualized) one-period lagged quarterly GDP deflator inflation rate (as opposed to the 
lagged four-quarter CPI-type rate in the U.K. case).  The deflator inflation rate is 
assumed to enter the rule even though it is the HICP aggregate that we use as an 
observable in obtaining our estimates below (where it is used to correspond, for the euro 
area, to the model’s consumer price index).  The assumption that euro area policy 
responds to deflator inflation follows Smets and Wouters (2005).
16 
 
Each economy has Phillips curves for wage and for price adjustment.  Each Phillips curve 
has its own univariate AR(1) shock term.  The remaining shocks in the model are two 
real shocks for each economy—government spending and technology—and a shock that 
we add to the EGL model, namely a shock to the UIP condition, so that the UIP condition 
in our model resembles equation (1).  The two real shocks for each economy (four in 
total) and the UIP shock are assumed to be AR(1) processes.  Because asymmetry of 
shocks is a central issue for the debate on monetary union, the stand we take on 
correlations of shocks is important.  We allow the government spending shock to be 
——————————————————————————————————— 
16 The United Kingdom is the “rest of world” for the euro area in the two-economy model we are using.  
Assuming a euro-area monetary policy response to deflator inflation captures, more than would an 
assumption of a policy response to consumer prices, the notion that euro area policy does not respond to 
U.K. inflation when the United Kingdom is outside the monetary union.   15
correlated across economies, and so too the technology shock to be correlated across 
economies.  This cross-correlation is allowed for by empirical estimation of cross-
correlations of the shock innovations.  We constrain the monetary policy and Phillips 
curve shocks to be uncorrelated across economies. 
 
The data used in model estimation are, for each economy, detrended logs of per capita 
consumption, output, and the quarterly real wage (with consumer prices used to deflate 
nominal wages); (consumer/retail) price inflation for each economy; the nominal U.K. 
Treasury bill rate; the euro area short-term nominal interest rate; and the change in the 
nominal exchange rate.  Logs of output, consumption, and the real wage are detrended 
over 1980−2005.  U.K. data sources are described in DiCecio and Nelson (2007).
17 Euro 
area data come from the ECB’s Area Wide Model database (see Fagan, Henry, and 
Mestre, 2001) and other ECB sources. The sterling/euro exchange rate is from Haver/IFS.  
Population data are from Haver, the ECB, and (for the United Kingdom) the Office of 
National Statistics. 
 
We estimate the model by Bayesian likelihood methods (see Smets and Wouters 2003, 
2007) on the sample period 1981 Q1−2005 Q4,
18 and report parameter estimates in 
Tables 1A to 1C.  The posterior estimates indicate a standard amount of price stickiness 
(around twice-a-year price adjustment, other than the adjustment occurring via the 
indexation term) for both economies.  But there is little estimated wage stickiness.  For 
the euro area, this result is puzzling in light of estimates such as those of Smets and 
Wouters (2003).  One of the simulation experiments that we undertake below allows for 
more wage rigidity in the euro area.  For both economies, the rule estimates indicate 
substantial interest-rate smoothing, a long-run response to inflation close to 1.5, and an 





17 In addition to the U.K. variables described there, we have nominal wages for the United Kingdom among 
our observables.  Nominal wages for the United Kingdom consist of total compensation (Office of National 
Statistics series dtwm.q), divided by aggregate employment (series bcaj.q). 
18 Starting estimation in 1981 allows the overhaul of doctrine that took place in U.K. economic 
policymaking in the late 1970s, documented in Nelson (2008), to make itself felt in changed monetary 
policy responses to the state of the economy.  As a related matter, omitting pre-1980 observations from the 
sample helps avoid inclusion in estimation many of the substantial breaks in means, trends, and variances 
from the 1970s to the 1980s in the U.K. data, documented for example by Stock and Watson (2002), Benati 
(2008), Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008), and Surico (2008).   16
 
Table 1A. Bayesian estimates of EGL (2007) model on U.K. and euro area data 
Estimation period 1981 Q1−2005 Q4 









Mode Mean  5%,  95% 
 
Price adjustment probability, U.K.  0.5000 
(0.1000) 
0.5161 0.5289 0.4461, 
0.6132 
Wage adjustment probability, U.K.  0.5000 
(0.1000) 
0.1294 0.1417 0.0977, 
0.1851 
Price adjustment probability, euro area  0.5000 
(0.1000) 
0.4720 0.4954 0.4066, 
0.5923 
Wage adjustment probability, euro area  0.5000 
(0.1000) 
0.1102 0.1287 0.0800, 
0.1790 




4.0525 4.0833 3.2859, 
4.8279 




3.2325 3.2495 2.8352, 
3.6897 
Interest smoothing, U.K. policy rule  0.7500 
(0.1000) 
0.4544 0.4609 0.3444, 
  0.5782 
Inflation response, U.K. policy rule  1.5000 
(0.2500) 
1.6423 1.6874 1.5032, 
  1.8676 
Output response, U.K. policy rule  0.1250 
(0.0500) 
0.1116 0.1193 0.0792, 
0.1627 
Interest smoothing, euro area policy rule 0.7500 
(0.1000) 
0.7896 0.7926 0.7585, 
  0.8296 
Inflation response, euro area policy rule  1.5000 
(0.2500) 
1.2744 1.3197 1.1741, 
  1.4565 
Output response, euro area policy rule  0.1200 
(0.0500) 
0.0845 0.0917 0.0460, 
0.1358 
Note: The estimated probabilities of wage and price adjustment are the probability that no 
discretionary adjustment is allowed this period (in which case a default adjustment takes place of 
indexation to the previous period’s inflation rate of the index in question).  Beta distribution prior 
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Table 1B. Bayesian estimates of EGL (2007) model on U.K. and euro area data 
Estimation period 1981 Q1−2005 Q4 
Shock autoregressive processes 
 
Parameter interpretation  Prior  Posterior 
 Mean  Mode  Mean  5%,  95% 
AR(1) parameter, U.K. technology  0.8500  0.9485  0.9302  0.8788, 
0.9797 
AR(1) parameter, U.K. wage Phillips 
curve shocks 
0.8500 0.9218 0.8523 0.7185, 
0.9952 
AR(1) parameter, U.K. monetary policy 
shocks 
0.8500 0.4752 0.4795 0.3648, 
0.5992 
AR(1) parameter, U.K. IS shocks  0.8500  0.9802  0.9760  0.9594, 
0.9984 
AR(1) parameter, U.K. price Phillips 
curve shocks 
0.8500 0.9924 0.9872 0.9754, 
0.9984 
AR(1) parameter, UIP shocks  0.8500  0.9391  0.9265  0.8792, 
0.9753 
AR(1) parameter, euro area technology  0.8500  0.8147  0.7694  0.6271, 
0.9049 
AR(1) parameter, euro area wage 
Phillips curve shocks 
0.8500 0.9218 0.8548 0.7248, 
  0.9956 
AR(1) parameter, euro area monetary 
policy shocks 
0.8500 0.2482 0.2563 0.1773, 
  0.3356 
AR(1) parameter, euro area IS shocks  0.8500  0.9471  0.9388  0.9120, 
0.9643 
AR(1) parameter, euro area price 
Phillips curve shocks 
0.8500 0.9882 0.9789 0.9608, 
0.9983 
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Table 1C. Bayesian estimates of EGL (2007) model on U.K. and euro area data 
Estimation period 1981 Q1−2005 Q4 
Innovation variance/covariance estimates 
 
 Prior  Mode  Mean  5%,95% 
Standard deviation of innovations: 
Technology, U.K.  0.100%  1.049%  1.126%  0.899%, 
1.361% 
Technology, euro area  0.100%  0.620%  0.714%  0.528%, 
0.912% 
Government spending, U.K.  0.100%  0.760%  0.775%  0.673%, 
0.879% 
Government spending, euro area  0.100%  0.610%  0.620%  0.518%, 
0.718% 
Monetary policy rule, U.K.  0.100%  0.213%  0.217%  0.190%, 
0.244% 
Monetary policy rule, euro area  0.100%  0.148%  0.149%  0.129%, 
0.170% 
UIP disturbance  0.100%  0.165%  0.189%  0.129%, 
  0.248% 
Price Phillips curve shocks, U.K.  0.100%  1.045%  1.049%  0.728%, 
 1.346% 
Price Phillips curve shocks, euro area  0.100%  0.915%  0.898%  0.626%, 
1.140% 
Wage Phillips curve shocks, U.K.  0.100%  0.046%  0.078%  0.024%, 
0.149% 
Wage Phillips curve shocks, euro area  0.100%  0.046%  0.117%  0.022%. 
0.241% 
Note: Inverse gamma distribution prior used for estimation of standard deviations. 
Cross-economy correlations of innovations 
Technology 0.000  0.159  0.149  −0.018, 
 0.311 
Government spending  0.000  0.233  0.226  0.050, 
   0.406 
Note: Uniform distribution prior used for estimation of correlations. 
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With the partial exception of the monetary policy shocks, which have only moderate 
autocorrelation, all the estimated shocks in the model are strongly persistent.  In  
particular, the UIP shock is highly serially correlated.  This autocorrelation combines 
with the estimated innovation variance to give an unconditional standard deviation for the 
UIP shock of about 0.5%, a surprisingly modest value. 
 
There is considerable asymmetry in the real shocks facing each economy, with the 
correlation between innovations to technology being below 0.2 and that between 
government spending innovations being below 0.3. This is consistent with previous 
evidence for European economies.  For example, Söderström (2008, p. 10) argues that 
“asymmetric shocks seem to be important for the Swedish economy,” while Artis and 
Ehrmann’s (2006) VAR analysis suggests that German and U.K. real shocks may even be 
negatively correlated.   
 
A serious question raised about empirical open-economy DSGE models is raised by 
Justiniano and Preston (2006).  They argue that estimated (small) open-economy 
structural models understate the contribution of international shocks to an open 
economy’s economic fluctuations.  In their empirical example of the United States and 
Canada, the U.S. shocks in combination contribute about two-thirds to Canadian output 
fluctuations in an identified VAR, but to less than 10% of Canadian output variation in 
the estimated DSGE model.  We have looked at the impact on our results of this problem 
by comparing our estimated open-economy structural model for the euro area and the 
United Kingdom with an identified VAR including data for the two economies.  The 
VAR is a four-lag system consisting of a major subset of the variables we use in 
estimation of the structural model: namely, output growth, inflation, and interest rates for 
both economies, as well as the change in the nominal exchange rate.  The VAR identified 
shocks are obtained with a Choleski decomposition, with euro variables ordered first, 
followed by the exchange rate, then the U.K. variables, and the ordering of the variables 
within each block being: interest rate; output growth; inflation.  This identified VAR 
delivers an estimated contribution of foreign shocks (including the exchange rate shock) 
to U.K. output growth variability of 32.7%. The contribution of foreign shocks (including 
the UIP shock) to U.K. output growth variation in the estimated structural model, on the 
other hand, is 29.9%. The results differ from Justiniano and Preston’s in two respects.  
First, for the identified VAR, the estimated foreign contribution to domestic economic 
variability is more modest in our example—and this is despite the fact that we do, and 
Justiniano and Preston do not, include the exchange rate shock among the foreign shocks.    20
Second, in moving to the structural model, we do not find a dramatically smaller 
contribution of foreign shocks’ contribution to domestic economic fluctuations.  In that 
sense, the understatement problem for our euro area/U.K. structural model is less serious 
than that found by Justiano and Preston (2006) for their open-economy model of the 
United States and Canada.  But this finding is subject to the proviso that, as noted above, 
we categorize exchange-rate shocks in both the VAR and structural models as foreign 
shocks.  It is true that most of the foreign contribution to U.K. output variation in our 
structural model comes from this source, whereas in the VAR, the shocks to the euro-area 
variables form the bulk of the foreign influence on U.K. output growth. 
 
5.  Simulation experiments 
 
In this section we present illustrative results from simulations of the model.  We consider 
three assumptions about model structure, starting with the estimated model as the 
baseline. 
 
A. Baseline case  
 
In the baseline case in Table 2, we assess U.K. economic performance using the 
estimated model under different monetary policy rules: historical policy and monetary 
union.  We focus on variability of output, CPI inflation, and the short-term nominal 
interest rate.  We acknowledge that open-economy models like those used in this paper 
frequently do not justify a monetary policy focus on aggregate CPI inflation, and direct 
attention instead to domestic-goods inflation or to a combination of domestic-goods and 
wage inflation.  But CPI inflation is bound to be a key variable in a study of U.K. policy 
options.  That is the inflation rate focused upon in the U.K. current policy framework, 
and so is a key variable to consider in judging the merits of U.K. entry into monetary 
union. 
 
Historical policy uses the U.K. and euro area interest-rate rules set out in the estimated 
model. The mode values in Tables 1A to 1C are taken to be the model estimates.  When 




t (where “EA” denotes euro area), and since the United Kingdom is then a euro area 
member, the euro area output and price aggregates that enter the euro area policy rule 
include the corresponding U.K. series.  The price aggregate is assumed to be a loglinear 
combination of the non-U.K. and U.K. economies’ output deflators.  Subject to these    21
 
Table 2.  Simulation results 
 
  Standard deviation (percent) of United Kingdom: 
 CPI  inflation 
(annualized) 
Output gap  Nominal interest rate 
(annualized) 
A. Baseline model (Common structure to both economies) 
Historical  rules  4.76 3.33 5.11 
Monetary union  
(UIP shocks continue) 
4.02 3.19 2.67 
Monetary union 
(UIP shocks vanish) 
3.87 3.19 2.57 
B. Model with greater wage flexibility in United Kingdom 
Historical  rules  4.78 3.34 5.12 
Monetary union  





(UIP shocks vanish) 
17.53 4.81  2.49 
C. Model with U.K. imports predominantly intermediates 
Historical  rules  4.71 2.72 5.32 
Monetary union 
(UIP shocks continue) 
5.05 2.64 2.72 
Monetary union 
(UIP shocks vanish) 
4.96 2.64 2.62 
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augmented definitions of the aggregates, the interest-rate policy rule assumed for the 
monetary union is the same as that estimated empirically for the euro area: smoothing of 
0.79, a response to lagged quarterly inflation that implies a 1.27 “long-run” response, and 
a response to lagged detrended output that implies a 0.085 “long-run” reaction.
19 
 
Historical policy in our parameterized model gives, as reported in Table 2, standard 
deviations of 4.8% for inflation, 3.3% for the output gap, and 5.1% for the nominal 
interest rate.  The alternative regime of monetary union is considered with and without 
UIP shocks.  When UIP shocks are present, they act in a way that does not disturb 
equality of interest rates across economies; instead, UIP shocks effectively become a 
second IS shock and so a source of disturbance to output demand.  According to Table 2, 
monetary union reduces output gap variability and does so irrespective of the assumption 
about the presence of UIP shocks.  Improvement in U.K. inflation stabilization does 
occur with monetary union but is somewhat dependent on whether union eliminates UIP 
shocks.  The standard deviation of U.K. inflation falls if UIP shocks vanish.  
Nevertheless, even when UIP shocks are present, their effect on the results is not 
dramatic, apparently because our estimates imply a fairly modest variance for this class 
of shock. 
 
B. Wages relatively more flexible in the United Kingdom 
 
Estimates of a dynamic general equilibrium model for the United Kingdom in DiCecio 
and Nelson (2007) suggested that U.K. nominal rigidity was concentrated in prices, rather 
than spread across wages and prices equally.  This finding is roughly reflected in our 
estimates here too.  But it is puzzling that we also find that the probability of wage 
adjustment is also quite rapid in the euro area, which contrasts with estimates such as 
those of Smets and Wouters (2003).  In light of this, we now consider an alternative 
parameterization of the EGL model in which wages are more flexible in the United 
Kingdom than in the euro area.  Specifically, we raise the degree of nominal rigidity in 
the euro area above its estimated value.  It is now assumed that the probability that wages 
are not reoptimized is 0.60 in the euro area. 
 
——————————————————————————————————— 
19 The monetary policy shock autocorrelation and variances for the policymaker in the monetary union, are 
also those estimated in Tables 1B and 1C for the euro area.    23
We report the simulation outcomes in the middle set of results (Case B) in Table 2.  
When there is no monetary union, the standard deviations of U.K. series are virtually 
unchanged from those under the baseline parameterization.  Since the only change in 
parameterization is to the degree of euro area wage rigidity, the results make economic 
sense; they reflect the notion that floating exchange rates can insulate the domestic 
economy from divergences across economies in the degree of nominal rigidity.  The loss 
of the exchange rate mechanism and of an own-economy interest-rate rule now seem to 
have visible costs; U.K. inflation stabilization worsens drastically under monetary union, 
when compared to that under the historical U.K. monetary policy rule, regardless of 
whether UIP shocks are present.  The magnitude of the difference in inflation variability 
implied by historical rules and that implied by monetary union is very large in Table 2, 
and may be questioned.  The difference would likely be more modest if, for example, we 
had assumed a more modest divergence between U.K. and euro area nominal rigidity.
20  
We would not give credence to the quantitative magnitude of the results from this model 
setting.  But, qualitatively, the results illustrate the possibility that nominal exchange rate 
movements help compensate for differences in nominal rigidities across countries. 
 
As in the previous set of results, U.K. interest-rate variability does decline when there is 
monetary union.  Thus embrace of monetary union appears to confer on the United 
Kingdom more stable interest rates, but these are accompanied by a rule that is directed at 
aggregates of which U.K. variables make up only a modest portion.  Furthermore, the 
mismatch of contract durations across economies means that rules that are successful at 
stabilizing euro area inflation are less effective at stabilizing U.K. fluctuations.  The net 
outcome is greater U.K. macroeconomic instability. 
 
Monetary policy is less volatile in the sense that interest rate volatility declines when the 
United Kingdom joins the union; it gives up a domestic policy rule that was associated 
with less smooth interest rate behavior.  But inflation outcomes become more volatile for 
the U.K. economy.  What appears to be happening is that the less volatile rate behavior is 
destabilizing for U.K. inflation because of the major mismatch in nominal rigidity; i.e., 
the interest rate should be more volatile, or should be responding in a different way to 
shocks than what is implied by the euro rule, if the objective is to insulate the U.K. 
——————————————————————————————————— 
20 Equally, we found that making the discrepancy in nominal rigidity across the two economies larger than 
that used in Figure 2 worsens the variability of U.K. inflation.   24
economy from the effects of nominal rigidity.
21 The damage done by the imposition of 
the euro area rule overwhelms one beneficial effect on inflation variability arising from 
euro area wage patterns.  This beneficial effect is that the relatively greater euro area 
wage stickiness by itself should be helpful for U.K. inflation stabilization by stabilizing 
U.K. import price inflation.  This partial effect seems to dominate when the difference in 
wage stickiness across economies is a little less than what we are using in the table. 
 
C. Intermediate goods predominant 
 
We revert our settings of wage rigidity to the estimates in Table 1 in order to consider a 
third model variant.  Wilson (1976) and Allsopp, Kara, and Nelson (2006) argue that, for 
U.K. inflation analysis, it is appropriate to model all imports as intermediate goods.  With 
this formulation, imports enter the model alongside labor in the production process to 
yield final consumption goods.  We consider a parameterization of the EGL model that 
allows for this view of imports’ role to predominate.  In the baseline parameterization, 
100% of imports were final consumer goods; now, by contrast, 90% of imports are 
assumed to be intermediate goods and only 10% to be final goods.
22 We repeat the policy 
experiments with this alternative setting of the model in the final segment of Table 2.  
Monetary union appears to worsen inflation performance somewhat—even when UIP 
shocks are absent—and to reduce the variability of the output gap and the interest rate.   
When imports are primarily intermediates, exchange rate variations have a less automatic 
connection to CPI variations; the fraction of the CPI that is flexible and linked tightly to 
the exchange rate is small.  Under these conditions, extinguishing exchange rate 
variations is less likely to deliver improved inflation performance, if this also entails 






21 Output gap variability falls under union.  In a closed-economy sticky-price model with no Phillips curve 
shocks and no indexation, this reduction would by itself imply that policymakers had succeeded in 
removing the effects of nominal rigidity; it would necessarily be associated also with lower inflation 
variability.  But this implication does not carry over to the present model.  Because there are several 
sources of nominal rigidity in the open-economy model we use, as well as Phillips curve shocks, the 
stability of the U.K. output gap is not a reliable index (as it is in a sticky-price closed-economy model) of 
the effects of nominal rigidity, so CPI inflation is destabilized by the euro rule despite the accompanying 
improved stability of the gap. 
22 The intermediate technology is that in EGL (2007), including a 1/3 weight on imports.   25
6.  Conclusions 
 
We have considered euro area membership as a U.K. monetary policy option by studying 
the effect of monetary union under various parameterizations of the Erceg, Gust, and 
López-Salido (2007) model.  One issue in determining whether monetary union 
contributes to an improvement in U.K. macroeconomic stabilization is the status of the 
“UIP,” or foreign exchange risk-premium, shock.  Much hangs on whether the 
elimination of the sterling/euro exchange market will be associated with the suppression 
of UIP shocks, which have been thought to be a major source of exchange rate variation.  
Suppose these shocks stand in for pressures that the economy needs to adjust to whether 
it is part of a monetary union or not.  Then if the United Kingdom joined the euro area, 
UIP shocks, instead of vanishing, would continue to make themselves felt via different 
channels.  Our results suggest that monetary union may increase inflation variability if 
UIP shocks do not disappear at the inception of monetary union.  This effect is detectable 
even though, according to our estimates, UIP shocks are actually only a modest inherent 
source of exchange rate variation. 
 
We also affirmed that if the differences in the degree of nominal wage rigidity across the 
United Kingdom and the euro area are sufficiently large, U.K. inflation variability under 
monetary union is higher than that achievable under monetary policy autonomy.  Finally, 
we found that the improvement in U.K. economic stability under monetary union also 
diminishes if imports from the euro area are modeled as primarily intermediates instead 
of finished goods. 
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Appendix. The Erceg, Gust, and López-Salido (EGL) model setup 
 
The EGL (2007) setup, as applied here, consists of 25 equations determining the 
following 25 endogenous variables (with real variables in log-deviation form): 
 






















t s R p m c l y c τ ρ ζ  j=U.K., EA, 
 
where EA denotes “euro area.” 
 
The consumption bundles in each economy consist of the aggregates: 
 






t m c c ω ω + − =  j=U.K., EA, 
 
where c is total consumption, cD is consumption of domestically produced output, and mC 













t l z y + =  j=U.K., EA, 
 
so that output (expressed as a log-deviation from its steady state value) is equal to the 
sum of technology, z, and log labor input, l. 
 






t c y =  j=U.K., EA. 
 
There is a risk-sharing condition: 
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where ρt is the real exchange rate, and the g’s are IS shocks. 
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The intertemporal Euler equation for household consumption in the euro area is 
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where (R − πC ) is the euro area short-term real interest rate (measured in consumption 
units). 
 

























Wages are governed by the relations: 
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  j=U.K., EA, 
 
where πw is nominal wage inflation, (ζ − pCD ) is the log real wage in consumption units 
(i.e., the log real wage in output units, ζ, adjusted for the log aggregate relative price of 
consumer goods in terms of output, pCD); μw is a wage markup shock. The parameters θw 
(common across economies) and ξw (different across economies) respectively denote the 
steady-state wage markup and an index of the degree to which households are not given 
clearance to reoptimize nominal wages. 
 
Price inflation is driven by the Phillips curve: 
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= − − − + −  j = U.K., EA, 
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where π is the GDP deflator inflation rate; the probability ξp indexes the degree of 
nominal price stickiness; and μp is a price markup shock. 
 
The percent change in the real wage (in output units) is simply the difference between 
wage and price inflation, 
 








t − = − − ζ ζ  j=U.K., EA. 
 






















The growth rate of consumer prices (relative to output prices) can be written as the spread 
between consumer price and output price inflation: 
 








t CD p p − = − −  j=U.K., EA. 
 
The real exchange rate has the following relation to the terms of trade: 
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The following uncovered interest rate parity condition (in real terms) holds: 
 








t t t t euip R R + − − − = − + + + τ τ  
 
where euipt is the UIP shock. 
 
The percent change in the nominal exchange rate can be expressed as: 
 




t t t t t s s − + − = − − − τ τ  
 
In the case of no monetary union, we assume the monetary policy rules take the form: 
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the eRt being AR(1) monetary policy shocks. 
 





j, euip] are each assumed 
to be follow AR(1) laws of motion. 
 
The preceding outline features imports only as final consumer goods.  EGL (2007) also 
present a version of their model with some imports being intermediates.  We use a 
version of this model, making the assumption that some imports into the U.K. economy 
are used for production, in our Case 3 experiments in Table 2.  30
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